We propose a model of decision making that captures reluctance to bet when the decision maker (DM) perceives that she lacks adequate information or expertise about the underlying contingencies. On the other hand, the same DM can prefer to bet in situations where she feel specially knowledgeable or competent even the underlying contingencies have vague likelihood. This separation is motivated by the Heath and Tversky's competence hypothesis as well as by the Fox and Tversky's comparative ignorance e¤ect. Formally, we characterize preference relations % over Anscombe-Aumann acts represented by
Introduction
Motivated by the well-known Ellsberg paradox (1961) , ambiguity became an important issue in decision theory that models sensibility to the lack of precise probabilistic information. The most well known models capturing ambiguity sensitivity are given by preference relations with a non-additive functional representation, as in Schmeidler (1989) 's Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) 's Maxmin Expected Utility (MEU) models. In this perspective, the classical additive case of Subjective Expected Utility (SEU) of Savage (1954) (or Anscombe and Aumann (1963) ) imposes strong behavioral conditions on preferences, which includes independence, that implies in an insensitive or neutral attitudes towards ambiguity 1 .
The widely discussed hypothesis that people prefer to bet on known rather unknown probabilities is the basis for the notion of ambiguity aversion (uncertainty aversion). For instance, this hypothesis is essential in the MEU model where a DM behaves as if having a set of probability measures that determinates his ex ante valuation of any act by the corresponding worst expected utility 2 . Although ambiguity aversion presents many interesting applications in economic problems 3 , the generality of this pattern of attitude towards ambiguity is questionable 4 . Heath and Tversky (1991) discussed another pattern of behavior where a DM might prefer to bet in a context that she considers themselves competent than in a context where she feels ignorant or uninformed. Here, the term competence is used in a broad sense that includes skill, knowledge or understanding. This ideas motivate Heath and Tversky (1991) to propose the "competence hypothesis" asserting that the DM's willingness to bet on an event depends not only on the estimated likelihood and the precision of that estimate, but also on her general knowledge or understanding of the relevant context. In the widely discussed Ellsberg urns, we have the situation of partial ignorance characterized the inability of improving the knowdedge of the proportion of balls in the urn. Fox and Tversky (1995) extended the Heath and Tversky's analysis by asking what conditions produce ignorance aversion. The main idea in Fox and Tversky (1995) is that the DM's con…dence betting on a target event is enhanced (diminished) when she contrasts her knowledge of the event with her inferior (superior) knowledge about another event, or when she compares himself with less (more) knowledgeable individuals. In this way, the "comparative ignorance hypothesis" of Fox and Tversky (1995) asserts that ambiguity aversion is driven by a comparison with more familiar sources of uncertainty or expert and it is diminished in the absence of such a comparison. Also, following again Hearth and Tversky (1991), in many situations the DM's perception of his level of knowledge concerning a target event might be extremely positive 1 Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) provided a complete characterization of a comparative notion in which the SEU model is the benchmark of ambiguity neutrality. 2 Indeed, Cerreia-Vioglio et. al. (2011) provided a representation result for uncertainty averse preferences under a very weak notion of independence. For instance, special cases are given by Chateauneuf and Faro (2009) and Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) . 3 See, for instance, Section 6 in Gilboa and Marinacci (2011). 4 An interesting dicussion on this topic is presented in Fox and See (2003) . 2 and that case she also may prefer to bet on her vague assessment of familiar events rather than bet on chance events with matched probability. We aim to focus on the cases where an event A is a clear and unambiguous reference for the DM in terms of familiar or unfamiliar contingencies. Next, we illustrate situations in which the DM has a referential chance event that separates her possible patterns of behavior:
Example 1 A bet is o¤ ered for a South American soccer commentator. It concerns quarter…nals in World Cup composed of four American teams and four European teams. He should bet on Cup champion. Since the commentator is an expert on American soccer, and he does not consider himself as a specialist on European soccer, he is optimistic in his success if an American team is chosen, and pessimistic in his success if an European team is chosen. Using the retrospect of the previous World Champions, the commentator considers that each continent has the same chance to win the World Cup, i.e., South America and Europe have 50% chance of winning. In fact, it sounds reasonable to suppose that it is not possible to assign a well de…ned probability for each team to be the champion. In this case, the results are ambiguous and they allow the commentator to behave di¤ erently depending on the event considered.
Example 2 A pulmonologist receives a patient with a undiagnosed disease. Before any exam, he will give some hypothesis in order to guide subsequent procedures. Despite his expertise in respiratory problems, the disease could be cardiac, for instance. In the preliminary diagnosis, the doctor needs to take into account whether the disease could be respiratory or not. Without accurate exams, the diagnosis involves uncertainty, because the disease could not be determined on probabilistic terms. Analyzing the frequency of patients with problems related to other specialities in his o¢ ce, the pulmonologist considers a probability of 70% for a disease associated with the respiratory system. If the disease pointed out by the doctor is related to respiratory system, he will be optimistic about his prognostic. However, if the prognostic is related to cardiac system, then he will be pessimistic about his judgment. In this case, he will appoint a specialist in cardiac problems. The patient need not be informed about the process of medical decision. This paper studies a type of decision process and, in this case, this process could be only mental.
Example 3 A stock broker specialist in technology …rms is hired by a stock brokerage. We assume that the stock broker prefers to handle technology …rms assets than other …rms assets. Here, uncertainty is related to the future prices of assets. Suppose that a bet is proposed for the stock broker in which he must point out the …rm that will have the better performance in a group of ten assets of technologic and commodities …rms. In general, assume that it is well known that 30% of the time the better performance is related to technologic …rm. Nevertheless, it is unclear which is the likelihood associate to any speci…c asset to be the best.
The common feature in these examples previously discussed is the existence 3 of a referential event, which can viewed as an objective information that DMs obtain before making the decision. In Example 3, the set of states of nature can be described by all possible performances of assets. Due to the behavior of the Stock Broker in face of the uncertainty associated with the assets future prices, he will split the states of nature in two groups of best performace: technology assets and commodity assets. He will be optimistic with the …rst group and pessimistic with the second one.
Formally, let S be the set of states of nature capturing the possible performances of all assets. Let A be the set of events in which the Stock Broker is pessimistic (management of commodity assets) and its complementary A c the set of events in which the Stock Broker is optimistic (management of technological assets).
For the Stock Broker to take a comparison, it is reasonable to think that he has in mind a set of probability distributions in which he follows the forecast given by highest expected utility when he manages technology assets, otherwise he follows the forecast given by worst expected utility. In a general context, we propose a model in which, given an act f : S ! X, the DM behaves as if evaluating f according to the functional given by
where u : X ! R is an a¢ ne utility function and A is a referential event for the DM in terms of perception of her expertise or ignorance 5 .
In this representation, C is a set of probabilites that characterizes the DM's beliefs and the partition fA; A c g captures the separation of her attitudes toward uncertainty.
This paper is organized into four sections. After this introduction, the section 2 contains the notation and framework. The section 3 is devoted to the axioms, main theorem and the case of Choquet Expected Utility. The last section contains the Appendix with the proofs of our results.
Notation and Framework
Consider a set S of states of nature, endowed with a -algebra of subsets or events, and a non-empty set X of consequences. We denote by F the set of all (simple) acts: …nite-valued functions f : S ! X which are -measurable 6 . Moreover, we denote by B 0 (S; ) the set of all real-valued -measurable simple functions a : S ! R. Given an event A 2 ; the induced characteristic function is de…ned by the mapping 1 A : S ! f0; 1g with 1 A (s) = 1 , s 2 A. The norm in B 0 (S; ) is given by kak 1 = sup s2S ja(s)j (called sup norm) and we can de…ne the space of all bounded and -measurable functions by taken
i.e., B(S; ) consists of all uniform limits of …nite linear combinations of characteristic functions of sets in (see Dunford and Schwartz, 1958 , page 240). For any subset K R, we de…ne B 0 (K) := fa 2 B 0 (S; ) : a (s) 2 K; 8s 2 Sg,
The conjugate of a capacity v is a capacity de…ned by v (A) := 1 v (A c ), for all A 2 . It is easy to show that a capacity v is convex if, and only if, v is concave. For a capacity v, we de…ne:
It is also easy to see that core(v) = acore( v).
A capacity p is a (…nitely additive) probability when for any E; F 2 such that E\F = ; we have that p (E [ F ) = p (E)+p (F ). We denote by := ( ) the set of all (…nitely additive) probability measures p : ! [0; 1] endowed with the natural restriction of the well-known weak* topology (ba; B).
Given a set of probabilities measures C , we say that an event A 2 is C-unambiguous if for all priors p; q 2 C it follows that p (A) = q (A). The convex hull of a set C is de…ned by co (C) := \ fD : D C and D is convexg. Given a function a 2 B, the Choquet integral of a with respect to v is given by Z
where, fa g := fs 2 S : a (s) g. For short, we denote,
. Of course, if v is a probability measure we obtain the usual notion of integration with additivity of integrals. Also, given a function a 2 B, for any event A 2 , the integral of a over A is given by Z
Clearly, note that u(f ) 2 B 0 (S; ) whenever u : X ! R and f belongs to F, where the function u(f ) : S ! R is the mapping de…ned by u(f )(s) = u(f (s)); for all s 2 S.
Let x belong to X, de…ne x 2 F to be the constant act such that x(s) = x for all s 2 S: Hence, we can identify X with the set F c of constant acts in F.
Additionally, we assume that X is a convex subset of a vector space. For instance, this is the case if X is the set of all …nite-support lotteries on a set of prizes Z, as in the classic setting of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) .
Using the linear structure of X we can de…ne as usual for every f; g 2 F and 2 [0; 1] the act:
Given f; g 2 F and A 2 , f Ag denote the act delivering the consequence f (s) for s 2 A and g (s) for s 2 A c . Also, we de…ne the family of acts that are uncertain only over A by
The decision maker's preferences are given by a binary relation % on F, whose usual symmetric and asymmetric components are denoted by s and .
Finally, for any f 2 F, an element
Axioms and Main Theorem
The class of preference that we propose here is characterized by the properties described in the axioms below. 
Axioms
A3 Continuity: For all f; g and h in F , the sets:
A4 Monotonicity: For all f and g in F :
If f (s) % g (s) for all s 2 S; then f % g:
A5 Event Dependence: There is a referential event A 2 , such that, for all f and g in F , x; y 2 X, and 2 (0; 1) :
Nontrivial weak order, continuity and monotonicity are the same as the ones used in Anscombe and Aumann (1963) . The Certainty Independence Axiom is the same as the one used in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . Recall that this axiom is more weaker than independence axiom fundamental for the Anscombe and Aumann (1963)'s representation. Moreover, this axioms allows the possibility of hedging, a notion impossible in the Independence axiom. In addition, the Ellsberg paradox violates the independence axiom because the preferences are reversed when is mixing with a nonconstant act.
Axiom A5 is more general than the well know Uncertainty Aversion axiom fundamental for the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)'s representation. Nevertheless, this axiom considers the state space S divided in two complementary events, A and A c , in which the DM has di¤erent attitudes towards uncertainty over F A and F A c . In A and its sub-events, the DM is uncertainty averse, whereas for A c and its sub-events the DM is uncertainty seeking (loving). Indeed, if A = S or if for all p 2 C we have p (A c ) = 0 then Axiom A5 implies the same behavioral pattern as the Uncertainty Aversion axiom of Schmeidler (1989) .
Axiom A5c asserts that for all consequence x 2 X and all act f , the induced acts f 1 := f A x and f 2 := xAf generate an average of the corresponding certainty equivalents which is indi¤erent to the mixture average of f and x. Note that this property holds for the Subjective Expected Utility model for any pair of acts f; g 2 F. Actually, if % is a SEU preferences, then
x f and y g =)
Main Theorem
Theorem 4 Let % be a binary relation on F . Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) The preference relation % satis…es the Axioms A1 -A5;
(2) There exists an a¢ ne utility function u : X ! R, and a nonempty, (weak ) compact, convex set C of …nitely additive probability over ; and a Cunambiguous (referential) event A 2
where the pair (u; C) represents % in the sense that:
where,
Moreover, if another pair (u 1 ; C 1 ) also represents % then there exist > 0 and 2 R such that u ( ) = u 1 ( ) + and C = co (C 1 ).
This representation captures choices situations as those discussed in the Introduction. First, note that the event A is unambiguous with respect to C, that is, for all priors p; p ; 2 C; the agreement p (A) = p ; (A) holds. In this way, we call the event A as a chance event. In the soccer example, the commentator might behaves in accordance with this model. The chance event A is related to European teams and A c is associated to South American teams, both events has 50% of occurrence. An important feature is that acts given by f = xAy; with x; y 2 X, are "unambiguous" in the sense that the commentator evaluate such acts in a similar way of an expected utility agent. On the other hand, if an act f is uncertain over A or over A c the commentator associates a pessimistic evaluation of this act over A and an optimistic evaluation of this act over A c . For instance, the commentator might not be able to associates a well speci…ed probability to the success of Brazil in the world championship. Since the commentator is uncertainty averse with respect to A, he associates the worst expected utility to bet on an European team. This happens because the commentator does not judge himself competent for this bet. On the other hand, with respect to the complementary events A c and its sub-events, the commentator associates the best plausible expected utility for bet in a south American team.
In the same way, in the medical example, the reference event is the "general cause" of illness. Following the Introduction, the set A corresponds to cardiac illness and the set A c corresponds to respiratory illness. Due to the frequency a patient appears with cardiac problems in his clinic, the specialist point out 70% of probability for the illness to be cardiac. Although he can infer about the nature of the illness through objective probabilities, the illness is uncertain. Thus, the doctor will give a higher weighting for his success in pointing out the illness when it is related with respiratory system and will underestimate his inference with a less weighting to success in case of a cardiac illness.
In the third example, the reference event is the company sector in which the stockbroker will manage the asset. The stockbroker should to decide who company his stock brokerage will invest in a set of companies comprised by commodities …rms and technology …rms. The stockbroker knows that 30% of the time the better achievement is related to technology companies, his speciality. Then, A represent the commodity companies and A c the technology companies. Although he knows the probability that some technology …rm has the better achievement, he does not know speci…cally which company will be the better. Given his specialty, he associates the better feasible expected utility for bet in a technology …rm, represented in the functional by the component max p2C R A c u (f ) dp, and the worst feasible expected utility for bet in a commodity …rm, represented by the component min p2C R A u (f ) dp, because he considers himself competent for investments in technology …rms and ignorant about invest in commodity …rms. 8 
The Case of Choquet Expected Utility
Our main result characterizes preferences relations % with a multiple priors representation, where beliefs are modeled by a set of probability measures C , and the reference event A 2 is a chance event. In this Section we aim to characterize the special case given by C = core (v), where v is a convex capacity. In this case, our representation J can be rewrite as
and by Schmeidler (1989) ,
Also, we will see that this representation is also a special case of CEU model as proposed by Schmeidler. Wakker (1990) proposed an elegant characterization of optimism and pessimism in the CEU model through comonotonicity, without imposing uncertainty aversion as proposed by Schmeidler (1990) and Chateauneuf (1991) 7 . In a similar way, we can impose conditions in order to obtain the CEU representation discussed above.
Let us provide the fundamental de…nitions for the next result: Mixture-Independence: We say that the preference relation % satis…es Mixture-Independence if for all f; g; h 2 F and for all 2 (0; 1)
We say that the act f; g 2 F are %-comonotonic if there do not exist states s; s 0 2 S such that f (s) f (s 0 ) and g (s 0 ) g (s) .
Pessimism-Independence:
We say that the preference relation % satis-…es Pessimism-Independence over H F if for all f; g; h 2 H, with g and h comonotonic, and for all 2 (0; 1)
Optimism-Independence:
We say that the preference relation % satis-…es Optimism-Independence over H F if for all f; g; h 2 H, with f and h comonotonic, and for all 2 (0; 1)
We refer to Wakker (1990) for a discussion on the meaning of such notions of independence. Our characterizations follows as:
Theorem 5 Let % be a binary relation on F . Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(1) The preference relation % satis…es the Axioms A1, A3, A4, A5c, Pessimism-Independence over F A ,and Optimism-Independence over F A c ;
(2) There exists an a¢ ne utility function u : X ! R, and a convex capacity v over such that
Moreover, u is unique up to a positive a¢ ne transformation, and v is uniquely determined. Furthermore, by considering for all E 2 ;
Appendix
Proof of the Main Theorem Part (1) ) (2) is straightfoward except Axiom A5. Part (2) ) (1) will result from Lemma 1 to Lemma 4.
Axiom A5
Part A5a: Suppose f Ax gAx, then we have J (f Ax) = J (gAx). i.e.,
Since A is unambiguous,
Using min (a + b) min a + min b, we can write
so,
= J (f Ax) :
i.e.,
Then, like the proof above, based on max (a + b) max a + max b, we can write,
Part A5c: Since 0 2 u (X), there exists x 2 X such that u ( x) = 0. Now, given f 2 F and x; y 2 X such that x f A x and y xAf . Because J represents %, we obtain,
Thus,
then,
Note that for all s 2 S,
Part (2) implies (1):
Given % F F satisfying A1 -A5, we need to …nd a representation J :
By A1, A2 and A3, the preference % j X X restricted to consequences, sat-is…es the well known conditions for the existence of a a¢ ne and nonconstant function u : X ! R such that, for all x; y 2 X,
Moreover, we can assume that 0 2 int (u (x)).
We note that for all f 2 F; there exists x f 2 X such that f Note that, I is well de…ned over B 0 (u (X)): given a a such that a = u (f ) and a = u (g), therefore u (f (s)) = u (f (s)), for all s 2 S. By the monotonicity axiom, f (s) g (s) for all S implies f g.
Thus, x f x g , which leads to J (f ) = J (g). I.3 By homogeneity, we can assume, without loss of generality, that 2a and 2k1 s 2 B 0 (u (X)). Let = I (2a) = 2I (a) and u (f ) = 2a for all f 2 F, taking y; z 2 X where u (y) = 1 s and u (z) = 2k1 s . If f y, by axiom A5c, we have,
Therefore, 
Then, we can write,
I.5a Let a; b 2 B 0 (u (X)). It is enough to show that
Given f; g 2 F such that u (f A x) = aA0 and u (gA x) = bA0. If I (aA0) = I (bA0), by uncertainty aversion over F A 9 , we obtain that
Now, in the case of I (aA0) > I (bA0), let k = I (aA0) I (bA0). We de…ne c = bA0 + k1 s , thus through the certainty independence axiom, we have I (c) = I (bA0) + k = I (aA0). Applying the later axiom again and uncertainty axiom, we get I.5b Let a; b 2 B 0 (u (X)). It is enough to show that,
Given f; g 2 F such that u ( xAf ) = 0Aa and u ( xAg) = 0Ab. If I (0Aa) = I (0Ab), by uncertainty seeking over F A c 10 , we obtain
Now, if I (0Aa) > I (0Ab), let k = I (0Aa) I (0Ab). We de…ne c = 0Ab + k1 s , in which , by certainty independence, we have I (c) = I (0Ab)+k = I (0Aa). Again, by certainty independence, and uncertainty seeking we get
We need show that I (a) = I (aA0) + I (0Aa). Let a 2 B 0 (u (X)) where a = u (f ). Additionally, a can be written as,
According to relation 1, we get
Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) showed that 11 there exists a unique and continuous extension of I to the whole B (S; ) when I is monotonic, constant additive and positively homogeneous. Furthermore, this extension satis…es properties I.1 -I.5. as in our previous lemma. Recall that, given a set of probabilities C
, an event A is called a chance event if A is unambiguous w.r.t. C (8p; q 2 C; p (A) = q (A)). Proof: Before to applying the classical results of MEU to our functional, we need to describe the dual of B A and B A c .
For a given event A, note that the induced collection of events
It is a contradiction, because, Then I 1 : B (S; A ) ! R satis…es the conditions of the main Lemma in Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) and, therefore, there exists a nonempty, closed and convex set C 1 ba 1 (S; A ) such that for all a 2 B (S; A ) 12 I 1 (a) = min p2C1 Z S a dp:
Similarly, for I 2 : B (S; A c ) ! R, we use the subadditive version in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , i.e., there exists a nonempty, closed and convex set C 2 ba 1 (S; A c ) such that for all b 2 B (S; A c ),
We note that given a function a 2 B (S; ), we have that aA0 2 B (S; A ) and 0Aa 2 B (S; A c ). Therefore,
a dp:
Now, by I5c, I (a) = I (aA0) + I (0Aa) = I 1 (aA0) + I 2 (0Aa) = min p2C1 Z A a dp + max p2C2 Z A c a dp:
So, we have proved that given for any function a 2 B (S; ), follows that
where C 1 ba 1 (S; A ) =: A and C 2 ba 1 (S; A c ) =: A c . Thus, A is unambiguous with respect to C 1 and unambiguous with respect to C 2 . Hence, there exists r 2 R such that, 8p; p 0 2 C 1 , p (A) = p 0 (A) = r and 8q; q 0 2 C 1 , q (A) = q 0 (A) = r. Now, de…ning the set C = fp 2 : 9p 1 2 C 1 ; 9p 2 2 C 2 such that pj A = p 1 and pj A c = p 2 g :
Note that C is convex. In fact, for p; q 2 C, there exists p 1 ; q 1 2 C 1 and exists p 2 ; q 2 2 C 2 such that pj A = p 1 , pj A c = p 2 , qj A = q 1 , and qj A c = q 2 .
Hence, p+(1 ) q, with [0; 1], is such that [ p + (1 ) q] j A = [ p 1 + (1 ) q 1 ] 2 C 1 because C 1 is convex.
Similarly, [ p + (1 ) q] j A c = [ p 2 + (1 ) q 2 ] 2 C 2 because C 2 is convex. Then C is convex. Also, C 6 = ;: Given an arbitrary pair of probabilities p 1 2 C 1 and p 2 2 C 2 , and we can take p over by where pj A = p 1 and pj A c = p 2 .
Remains to show that C is a closed set (weak ). Given a net fp g such that p 2 C; for all and p * p is necessary shows that p 2 C. We have p * p (def.) () 8a 2 B (S; ), Z a dp ! Z a dp:
Since p 2 C; for all , then given , there exist p 1 2 C 1 and p 2 2 C 2 such that p j A = p 1 and p j A c = p 2 . Therefore, for all a 2 B (S; A ) B (S; ), Z a dp ! Z a dp:
So, Z
A a dp ! Z A a dp and, Z A a dp 1 ! Z A a dpj A ;
i.e., p 1 * pj A , since C 1 is closed, pj A 2 C 1 . Analogously, for all a 2 B (S; A c ) Z a dp ! Z a dp;
notably, Z A a dp ! Z A a dp:
In other words, Z A a dp ! Z A a dpj A c ;
i.e., p 2 * pj A c . Since C 2 is closed pj A c 2 C 2 .
20
In short, p * p with pj A 2 C 1 and pj A c 2 C 2 , i.e., p 2 C, which shows that C is closed (weak ). Now, note that for a function a 2 B 0 (S; A ), a = P N i=1 i 1 Ei + k1 A c where i 2 R and E i 2 A we have (E i ) N i 1 is a partition of A. Then, for all p 1 2 C 1 , Z a dp 1 = N X i 1
and for all p 2 C there is a correspondent p 1 2 C 1 with pj A = p 1 . We can write, Z a dp 1 = N X i=1 i p (E 1 ) + kp (A c ) = Z a dp:
Thus, min p12C1 R a dp 1 = min p2C R a dp. If a = 2 B 0 (S; A ), we can take a sequence (a n ) n2N B 0 such that a n k k 1 ! a. Hence, given p 2 C there exists p 1 2 C 1 such that pj A = p 1 and, Z a dp = lim n!1 Z a n dp = lim n!1 Z a n dp 1 = Z a dp 1 :
The procedure is similar for a 2 B (S; A c ). Then we obtain that I (a) = min p2C Z A a dp + max p2C Z A c a dp;
which concludes the proof of our main result. Proof of Theorem 5: The proof of "if, and only if" follows from a combination of our Main Theorem with Lemma 7 and Corollary 8 (page 460) in Wakker (1990) . Note that our condition A5c plays the same rule as in the proof of our Main Theorem. 
